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A series of experiments among different social groups in both Albania and the Netherlands 
give the opportunity to compare behavioral patterns related to tax evasion. Aside from the 
decision whether or not to evade taxes, subjects have to choose a source of income, where 
one type enables subsequent tax evasion. The results allow us to conclude that subjects take 
the possibility of evasion into account when deciding on the source of income. In addition, 
we argue that the distinct levels of tax evasion outside of the laboratory in the two countries 
are not attributable to different tax attitudes or cultures, but to different tax institutions and 
the way individuals have learned to deal with them. We attribute tax evasion in Albania to 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The informal sector is attracting more and more attention. Over the years, numerous studies 
have emerged, analyzing the informal sector in underdeveloped and developed countries, as 
well as in countries in transition from socialist to market oriented economies (for recent 
surveys, see Schneider & Enste, 2000 and Gërxhani, 2002). The term ‘informal sector’ refers 
to a broad phenomenon, including: tax evasion, activities against government regulation, 
criminal activities and more. Research usually focuses on any one of these in isolation, even 
though they are often directly or indirectly related to each other. In this study, we focus on 
one of the phenomena related to the informal sector: tax evasion.
1 
There are two main reasons for focusing on tax evasion. First of all, it is directly linked 
to large budget deficits and hence to lower investments in public goods. Besides being of 
general interest from an economic point of view, this means that the effects may differ 
significantly depending on the level of development of a country. This is one of the matters 
we are interested in. Second, studying tax evasion creates the opportunity to study the 
decision-making process related to the informal sector at the individual level. Though tax 
evasion has been studied extensively (Tanzi, 1982, Feige, 1989, and many others), little 
research has been undertaken to get a better understanding of the individual decision whether 
or not to evade taxes.  
When studying tax evasion, it is important to distinguish between different types of 
income. In almost every country, one can make a distinction between income that is officially 
registered and unregistered income. Registered income is generally observed in jobs within 
the public sector and in private sector employment with contracts. Typically, taxes are 
withheld from the regular wage payments when income is registered. Unregistered income 
can occur in cases where there is no job contract and in case of self-employment. In the latter 
case, income must be self reported to the tax authorities in order to determine the income tax 
owed.  
Some (unknown) efficient distribution of labor across jobs with registered and 
unregistered income will exist. A well functioning labor market will help achieve this 
distribution. However, it is easier to evade taxes in case of unregistered income than when 
income is registered. This may provide individual incentives to choose a job where income is 
                                 
1 Although the literature provides various definitions of tax evasion, there is a common idea underlying them. 
The term tax evasion simply refers to the underreporting of taxable money income with the intention to escape 
taxes. University of Amsterdam 
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not registered. This incentive may distort the way the labor market works and cause 
inefficiencies in the distribution across types of jobs.
2 The experimental environment we will 
discuss below allows us to make the distinction between the two types of income. This allows 
us to study the choice of income type simultaneously with the decision whether or not to 
evade taxes. Hence, we can discuss the extent to which the evasion possibilities affect the 
choice of income type.
3 
 
Gërxhani's (2002) assertion that a distinction according to the level of a country's 
development is important for understanding tax evasion is the initial motivation for the study 
presented here. We study tax evasive behavior in two European countries, Albania (a country 
in transition) and the Netherlands (a developed country). The reason to focus on these two 
countries is as follows. First of all, Albania was the most isolated and the latest country in 
Eastern Europe to open itself up to democratic and economic changes. Therefore, when 
Albania entered the process of transition, it was struck by a (socio-)economic and 
institutional crisis that was even deeper than in other transition countries. This situation 
created suitable conditions for the informal sector to be the prevalent economy in Albania. It 
appeared everywhere. Initially starting as an emergency exit from the numerous problems of 
the formal sector, it later became an inevitable part of the Albanian society (Gërxhani, 2002). 
Given our wish to compare tax evasion in a country in transition to tax evasion in a 
developed country, Albania appears to be an appropriate choice for the former. The choice of 
the Netherlands as the developed country is based first of all on the observation that it is 
indeed a country with a very high standard of living and is (contrary to Albania) well 
developed and with stable economic and political institutions. Moreover, its size is 
comparable to Albania. As a practical matter, the facilities and experience of running 
experiments are readily available in the Netherlands. These two countries create a sharp 
contrast, which will allow a fertile basis for testing the difference in tax evasive behavior 
between a developed country and a country in transition.
4 
                                 
2 Of course, there may be inefficiencies as a consequence of the income tax per se as well. 
3 Collins and Plumlee (1991) analyze a different, but related, issue. They present an experiment where subjects' 
income (to be reported to the tax authorities) depends on an effort made and observe more effort when tax 
evasion is possible.  
4 Given Gërxhani's (2002) theory, it would be interesting to also study tax evasion in a developing country. 
Unfortunately, we did not have this opportunity. Nevertheless, the distinction between a developed and 
transition country remains of interest.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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In our study, we apply the experimental method. Although it has sporadically been used 
to study tax evasion before, this only holds for developed countries. An important motivation 
is that the laboratory provides an opportunity to obtain comparative results from two types of 
countries with respect to individuals’ attitudes towards tax compliance, while controlling for 
the numerous differences between the countries. In this way, we hope to get a grip on the 
individual decision involved and a better understanding of the factors that cause distinct 
levels of tax evasion between a developed country and a country in transition. Laboratory 
data provide an opportunity to directly test existing hypotheses on individual tax evasion.  
More specifically, the experiments allow us to compare behavior across countries when 
institutions are controlled for. The choice to evade taxes may be affected by institutions, by 
culture, or by both. By controlling for differences in institutions, we collect information about 
the effect of culture. The existing empirical evidence seems to show that Albanians evade 
taxes more often than the Dutch do (cf. section 2). Our experiments will provide us with 
information as to whether Albanian culture is more open to tax evasion or whether the 
difference is more likely due to more primitive tax collection institutions. 
 
When running experiments in different countries, one needs to be careful when drawing con-
clusions from observed differences. If one observes differences in behavior of one subject 
pool in country A and another in country B, it might be true that behavior in both countries 
differs. It might also be the case that behavior differs across subject pools in general. One 
needs a comparison of differences in behavior across countries to differences within countries 
before one can truly attribute differences across subject pools to country differences. In our 
setup we distinguish various subject pools within each of the two countries.  
 
In summary, the contribution of this paper is threefold:  
(1) we provide a comparative experimental study of tax evasion in a developed country and a 
country in transition; 
(2) we compare tax evasion across subject pools (i.e., socio-economic groups) within each 
country. This allows us to compare differences across countries to differences within a 
country; 
(3) we present a new laboratory environment in which subjects can choose between two 
possible sources of income: ‘registered’ and ‘unregistered’. 
 University of Amsterdam 
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The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the existing evidence of 
tax evasion in Albania and the Netherlands and review the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents our experimental design and conjectures about the treatment effects to be expected. 
Section 4 presents the experimental results, which are discussed in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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2. A  BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
2.1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF TAX EVASION IN THE NETHERLANDS AND ALBANIA 
There are more studies about the Netherlands than about Albania. These typically do not refer 
to tax evasion per se. Instead, they use terms like the 'unobserved’ or 'shadow' economy when 
referring to the informal sector. We assume that tax evasion is a major element in the 
phenomena they refer to. Boeschoten and Fase (1984) quantify the 'hidden' economy in the 
Netherlands in 1965–1982. They suggest a rising trend up to about 20% of GDP in this 
period. On the other hand, Frey and Weck (1981) give an estimate of 9,6% for 1977-1981. 
Schneider and Enste (2000) report on the average size of the ‘shadow’ economy for OECD 
countries, over 1990–93; 1994-95 and 1996-97. Their estimate for the Netherlands is about 
13-16%, 13.7% and 13.8% respectively.  
There is no quantitative evidence on the existence of tax evasion in Albania during 
communism. Nevertheless, as everywhere, there was an informal sector. Taxes could be 
evaded, for example, by not working in official employment or by selling privately grown 
agricultural products.
5 For the period of transition, numbers on tax evasion were, until 
recently, mainly based on anecdotal evidence and small-scale sample surveys.
6 In a recent 
macro-economic study, Feige (2002) applies the ‘electric consumption approach’ and 
‘currency ratio model’ to Albania and  estimates the average size of the Albanian unobserved 
economy at 65.4% and 48%, respectively. All in all, evidence appears to point at a higher 
level of tax evasion in Albania than in the Netherlands. 
 
2.2. TOOLS USED TO STUDY THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
Previous studies on the Netherlands and Albania have applied the traditional empirical tools 
in this field, focusing on two main approaches for analyzing the informal sector: the direct 
and the indirect approach. The direct approach uses sample surveys to gather information 
                                 
5 This evasion of taxes was less significant than in developed market economies, because personal income tax 
was less important.   
6 For example, the 1996 EBRD Transition Report claims that 70% of the households in Albania do not pay their 
utility bills (tax bills included). In addition, a study of the Albanian Center for Economic Research (ACER 
1999) reports that 73% of the surveyed enterprises (the sample unit) do not declare all of their profits. On 
average, this underreporting constitutes 20% of their profits. According to UNDP (2000), the informal economy 
accounts for an estimated 50% of GDP. University of Amsterdam 
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about individuals’ behavior, whereas the indirect approach derives conclusions about the 
informal sector from an analysis of macro-economic statistics. 
Both methods have serious shortcomings. The indirect approach does not give any 
information about the specifics of the informal sector (Thomas, 1992). In the direct method 
there is a potential respondent jeopardy
7 (Lee, 1985). In any survey, there is a problem of 
respondent’s motivation to answer seriously, but this problem appears to be especially 
relevant in studies of the informal sector and tax evasion.  
Recently, a third method is becoming more popular: laboratory experiments. Whereas 
other methods (direct and indirect) are used to analyze almost every aspect of the informal 
sector, the experimental method is mostly restricted to tax evasion. The first experimental 
study on tax evasion is a collaboration of social psychologists and economists (Friedland, 
Maital and Rutenberg, 1978). They study individuals’ behavior when confronted with 
changes in tax rates, penalties and audit probabilities. This and the following experimental 
studies on tax evasion are closely related. The basic design of these experiments is described 
in a survey by Alm (1991). It is simple: participants declare taxes based on an income 
determined in the experiment. They are provided with information regarding tax rates, audit 
probabilities and fines for cheating (underreporting income). Though there are varieties to 
this basic design, the results regarding tax compliance are quite robust. These results show 
that: 
 
(i)  tax evasion increases with the tax rate (Friedland et al., 1978);  
(ii)  tax evasion decreases with the level of fines (Friedland et al., 1978);  
(iii)  tax evasion decreases with the audit probability (Friedland et al., 1978);  
(iv)  tax evasion is lower when the proceeds are used to provide a public good (Alm et al., 
1991);  
(v)  the decision about tax evasion is made jointly with the decision on how much effort 
to put in income earning (Collins and Plumlee, 1991);  
(vi)  a large subset of people never cheat, because they appear to believe that cheating is 
wrong (Baldrey, 1986);  
(vii)   tax evasion increases with income (Giese and Hoffman, 1999);  
(viii)  women evade taxes less than men do (Giese and Hoffman, 1999).  
 
                                 
7 This refers to the respondents’ impression of being threatened by questions.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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As mentioned above, the main advantage of laboratory experimentation is the control it 
provides. A disadvantage is that the laboratory setting might not be applicable to the real 
world setting it aims at studying. The extent of external validity depends crucially on the 
experimental design, of course. An appropriately designed experiment complements research 
that applies other methods (such as the direct and indirect methods of studying the informal 
sector). For further discussion of the role of experiments in studying tax evasion, see Webley 
et al. (1991).  
 
2.3. CROSS-NATIONAL EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES  
By conducting and analyzing the same experiment in two countries, this paper is related to a 
variety of cross-country studies that have recently been undertaken (see Brandts, Saijo and 
Schram, 2000 for references). In many cases, differences in behavior are observed across 
countries (e.g., Roth, Prasnikar, Okuwo-Fujiwara and Zamir, 1991; Saijo and Nakamura, 
1995). Given that the experiments are conducted in exactly the same way in every country, 
this may cause some concern to economists because economic analysis is traditionally based 
on the premise that economic behavior is guided everywhere by common principles.  
  In Brandts et al. (2000), however, a public good experiment is conducted and no 
differences in behavior are found between subjects in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the 
Unites States. The question is then, why differences are observed in some studies and not in 
others. This might have to do with the subject pools used. As far as we know, no one has 
compared differences between subject pools within the same country to differences between 
subject pools across countries. Note that it is implicitly assumed that within country 
differences are relatively small if cross-country differences are attributed to cultural 
differences (as is often done). In this paper, we do include different subject pools in each 
country to get a more complete picture of behavior across countries.  
 University of Amsterdam 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND EXPECTED TREATMENT 
 E FFECTS 
 
3.1. GENERAL FEATURES OF THE PROCEDURES AND DESIGN  
The experiments are run manually in order to make it possible to organize them at various 
locations without having to arrange computer facilities. In each session there are 12 partici-
pants, divided into 3 groups of 4.
8 A session consists of 8 independent rounds. The 
experiment itself generally lasts less than one hour. Calculating payoffs takes some time, 
however, so the last subject usually leaves about 75 minutes after the start of the experiment. 
All experiments reported here took place in 1999-2000. 
In the first part of a round, subjects’ personal income for that round is determined. This 
income is private information, unknown to the experimenter or other participants. For rounds 
1-3 this is all that happens. Besides allowing participants to get acquainted with the decision 
at hand, these three rounds allow us to measure the individuals’ risk attitudes. We will use 
this to test the influence of risk attitude on the choice of income and tax evasion. In rounds 4-
8 there is a second part of each round where subjects have to report their income to the 
experimenter. This reported income is taxed. In some cases there is an audit. In case of 
underreporting, the subject is fined.  
 
3.2. TREATMENTS 
Our design distinguishes three treatments where we varied subject pools, audit probability 
and what we did with tax proceeds. We will discuss each in turn. A summary of our sessions 
is presented in table 1, below. 
The first important treatment in our experimental design is the distinction of subject 
pools. For reasons discussed above, these varied along two dimensions: country (the 
Netherlands, NL, and Albania, AL) and socio-economic category. For the latter we 
distinguished the following groups: (i) high school pupils (HS); (ii) university students (US); 
(iii) high school teachers (HT); (iv) university non-academic personnel (UP); and (v) 
university teachers (UT).
9 Sessions in Albania were run at the ‘Harry Fultz’ high school in 
                                 
8In one session (high school teachers in the Netherlands), there were only eight participants (two groups of 
four). 
9 We did not run sessions with university teachers in Amsterdam because we feared that the personal contacts 
both authors have with most of the faculty could cause serious experimenter effects. One could argue that the University of Amsterdam 
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Tirana and at the Economics Faculty of the University of Tirana. The Dutch sessions were 
run at the ‘Vossius Gymnasium’ high school in Amsterdam and at the University of 
Amsterdam.
10 
Second, we varied the audit probability for some subject pools. This allows us to test 
previous results on the effect of audit probability (Friedland et al., 1978 report decreasing tax 
evasion as the probability rises). In addition, it allows us to investigate whether the effect of 
the probability of being 'caught' is different in the Netherlands than in Albania. For all subject 
pools, we used a (high) probability of 1/2 of auditing the reported income (as described 
below). For the students in each country (NL-US and AL-US), we ran additional sessions 
where the audit probability was equal to 1/6. It will be shown below, that a risk-neutral 
subject will evade taxes when the audit probability is equal to 1/6 but not when it is 1/2. For 
the students in Albania (AL-US), we also ran sessions with no audits (probability equal to 0). 
We decided to do so after analyzing the results of the original (1/2 and 1/6) sessions, because 
this group appeared to be insensitive to the audit probability. Sessions without audit allow us 
to test the robustness of this result.  
As a final treatment, we ran sessions with and without a public good. In our first series 
of experiments, tax proceeds were aggregated within a group of 4 and divided equally among 
the group members. In this setup, taxes may be seen as contributions to a public good with 
mpcr = 1 (Isaac et al., 1984). After observing a relatively high level of compliance in the 
Albanian sessions, we considered the possibility that Albanian participants might be 
complying to taxes because they wish to contribute to the public good. In order to test this, 
we ran two sessions for AL-US where no public good was provided: tax proceeds were not 
returned to the participants in any way.  
In all sessions, groups remain constant across rounds and know how taxes and (if 
applicable) the public good are determined, but no information is provided between rounds 
about the tax proceeds themselves. Hence, even within groups, subjects are not provided with 
any kind of information about other subjects’ choices.  
 
                                                                                                    
subject pools used are quite similar to each other in many ways. Our results will show significant differences 
across some of these groups, however. With other groups these differences might even grow. 
10 We are grateful to the deans of both high schools and of the Faculty of Economics in Tirana for giving us the 
opportunity to run our experiments at their schools.    Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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Note from table 1 that the average earnings in experimental francs (the currency used in the 
experiment) across subject pools did not differ much. An exception is that earnings were 
higher in sessions with a low audit probability. 
 












AL-HS 2 /24 1/2  3490 Yes 100 fr = 33 lek
AL-US 2 /24 1/6 4284Y es 100 fr = 33 lek
AL-US 2 /24 1/2  3160 Yes 100 fr = 33 lek
AL-US 2 /24  0  3583 Yes 100 fr = 33 lek
AL-US 2 /24 1/2 2898 No 100 fr = 33 lek
AL-HT 2/24 1/2  3447 Yes 100 fr = 50 lek
AL-UP 2/24 1/2  3334Y es 100 fr = 50 lek
AL-UT 2/24 1/2  3177 Yes 100 fr = 50 lek
NL-HS 2 /24 1/2  3315 Yes 100 fr = fl.1.00
NL-US 2 /24 1/6  3414 Yes 100 fr = fl.1.00
NL-US 2 /24 1/2  3372Y es 100 fr = fl.1.00
NL-HT 1/8 1 /2  3501Y es 100 fr = fl.2.00
NL-UP 1/12 1/2  3076 Yes 100 fr = fl.2.00
Note: labels are defined in the main text; average earnings are in experimental francs (fr). The exchange rate is 
from francs to the local currency, Lek (Albania) and Guilder (NL, denoted by fl.). The official exchange rates 
were $1 = 141 Lek and $1 = 2,20 fl. at the time of the experiments. 
 
This is a consequence of fewer fines being administered. Furthermore, earnings were low in 
the sessions without public goods. This simply reflects the fact that tax proceeds were not 
redistributed amongst the participants. Note that we varied the exchange rate from francs to 
local currency in order to account for differences in purchasing power, both across countries 
and across pools within a country.  
 
3.3. DESIGN ISSUES RELATED TO CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIMENTS 
Following Roth et al. (1991) and Brandts et al. (2000), we consider three aspects of the design 
which require special attention when conducting a multi-national experiment: experimenter 
effects, language effects, and currency effects.  
 The  term  experimenter effect refers to the possibility that different sessions of the same 
experimental treatment may yield different results, due to possible effects of uncontrolled 
procedural differences across locations. In our case, the two authors of this paper ran all 
sessions. Therefore, in principle, this kind of experimenter effects is not expected. On the 
other hand, a priori we were afraid that Albanian participants might be excessively impressed 
by the presence of a western professor 'handing out money' (one of the authors is Dutch). To University of Amsterdam 
Tax Evasion and the Source of Income: An Experimental Study in Albania and the Netherlands  20
avoid this type of experimenter effect, the other author, an Albanian national working in the 
Netherlands, addressed the participants in Albania. The Dutch experimenter stayed in the 
background. In addition, the experiments are 'double blind' as long as no audit takes place.  
When there is no audit, the experimenters have no way of knowing whether or not the 
subjects have truthfully declared their income. When there is an audit, the experimenters do, 
however, discover whether or not the participants have reported truthfully. 
  Second, to control for unwanted language effects the instructions for the experiment 
were initially written in English, and then translated into Albanian and Dutch. In addition, one 
of the authors speaks both Dutch and Albanian and is able to check for differences that might 
have occurred because of the translation.
11  
  With respect to currency effects, it should be noted that the differences in wealth and 
purchasing power between the two countries and across groups within a country are large. We 
varied the exchange rate from experimental francs to the local currency as described in table 1 
in order to maintain sufficient and comparable saliency across groups. The actual rates used 
were determined by an educated guess. It is hard to conceive more objective method to 
determine them. 
 
3.4. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN 
For each subject in every round, income is determined by a random draw from an 
independent distribution. The distribution is chosen separately by each subject in each round. 
This is done by distinguishing two sets of envelopes. These are called the X-envelopes and 
the Y-envelopes. At the beginning of each round, subjects indicate on a written form whether 
they want to choose an envelope from the X-set or the Y-set. They are then asked to pick one 
of the six envelopes in that set for that round. In this envelope, they find a note with their 
income for that round. They open the envelope privately, so the realized income remains 
unknown to the experimenter and the others. Note that draws are independent: we prepared 6 
envelopes of each type for each subject in every round. Subjects know the distributions of 
incomes in the two sets. The distinct income values in the two sets are given in table 2. 
 
                                 
11 See Appendix 1 for the English version of the instructions.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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Table 2: Income distributions 




X-set 100 300 400 500 600 700 433.33  216.03  1 
Y-set  0  100 300 500 700 800  400  322.49  0,  1/6  or  1/2 
 
Note that the X-set has a higher average income and a lower standard deviation. The 
distribution of X-values stochastically dominates the distribution of Y values. Hence, X 
represents the risk neutral and risk averse choice, whereas a choice of Y is an indication of 
risk loving behavior. In the first three rounds, the choice between X and Y is the only 
decision subjects have to make. The number of X- and Y-choices in these rounds provides an 
indication of a subject’s attitude towards risk. 
  In rounds 4-8 subjects have to report their income and pay taxes. Here, we add a second 
difference between X and Y. Subjects are informed that X envelopes will always be audited. 
Instead, Y envelopes are audited with a probability of either 0, 1/6 or 1/2, depending on the 
treatment (see table 1). Subjects always report their income, and they know they will certainly 
be audited in case of an X-choice. If they choose Y, a die is thrown (independently per 
subject and round) to determine whether or not an audit will take place.
12 This distinction 
between the two types of envelopes represents a difference between registered (X) and 
unregistered (Y) income.  
  Subjects have to pay 25% of the reported income as a tax. In case of an audit, the tax 
consists of 25% of their actual income. In the public good sessions, the aggregate tax 
proceeds from a group of 4 are divided equally across the group members. This is done after 
completion of all 8 rounds. In the sessions without a public good, the tax proceeds are not 
returned to the participants.  
  If an audit reveals that a subject has underreported income, a fine of 25% of the actual 
income is imposed (on top of the tax payment). The proceeds of the fine are not added to the 
public good. Note that the fine is not dependent on the level of underreporting. Therefore, if a 
subject decides to evade taxes, expected earnings are maximized by reporting the minimum 
possible income (i.c., 0). If an audit reveals that a subject has overreported income, no fine is 
imposed. 
  
                                 
12 To avoid that the throw of a die reveals a subject’s choice, we also throw a die in case an X-envelope is 
chosen. In this case, an audit takes place irrespective of the outcome. University of Amsterdam 
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Summarizing, rounds 4-8 proceed as follows. First, subjects choose a source of income: 
registered (X) or unregistered (Y). Then, a random draw takes place to determine the 
realization of the income. Next, subjects report their income. It is then determined whether or 
not an audit will take place. If there is no audit, the tax is determined on the basis of the 
reported income. If an audit takes place and honest reporting is observed, actual income 
(which in this case equals the reported income) determines the tax and no fine is 
administered. If underreporting is observed, tax and fine are determined by the actual income. 
If overreporting is observed, actual income determines the tax and no fine is administered.  
At the end of a session we first determine the total tax revenue and public good payoff 
per group. Then subjects are called privately, so we can determine their payoff. They give us 
the 8 envelopes with the actual incomes in each of them. Note that for the cases without 
audit, this is the first time we observe the actual income. At this stage, however, we cannot 
determine how much they have declared. Hence, we can still not observe whether or not they 
have evaded taxes. We then determine the earnings as the sum of realized incomes plus the 
public good payoff and minus the taxes and fines paid.  
 
3.5. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND EXPECTED TREATMENT EFFECTS 
Before presenting the results, we provide a brief theoretical discussion of the subjects’ 
decision and conjectures about the treatment effects that we expect. Assume that an 
individual is only interested in the own earnings.
13 Recall that our setup only makes tax 
evasion potentially profitable in case a Y envelope is chosen. In this case, as argued above, 
our fining system makes reporting an income of 0 optimal once one has decided to evade 
taxes. Consider the case with public good. Given that a Y has been chosen with realization y, 
in case of an audit (probability p) the payoff from reporting 0 consists of y minus fine and tax 
plus 1/4 of the tax paid (from the public good). In case of no audit, the income is y. Taking 
account of an audit with probability p, the expected income from evasion is therefore p(y-
0.25y-0.25y + 0.0625y) + (1-p)y = y-0.4375py. The income in case of honest reporting is 
equal to y-0.25y+0.0625y= 0.8125y. Hence, a risk neutral subject will evade taxes (by 
reporting y=0) when y-0.4375py > 0.8125y, or p < 0.43. Hence, given a choice of Y, a risk 
neutral subject will evade taxes in our p=0 and p=1/6 treatments but will report honestly in 
case p=1/2.  
                                 
13 The consequences in case a subject attributes utility to the earnings of others are discussed in section 5.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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A priori, the expected income, x*, from choosing X is 433.33 and from Y, y*, is 400 
(cf. table 2). Taking into account the possibility of tax evasion implies that a risk neutral 
subject should choose X for the p=1/2 sessions. For p=1/6, the expected payoff from 
choosing Y and evading taxes is y*-0.4375y*/6 = 370.83. The expected payoff from 
choosing X is equal to x*-0.25x*+0.0625x* = 0.8125x* = 325.08, which is lower than the 
expected payoff from choosing a Y envelope. For p=0 the expected payoff of choosing Y and 
evading is even higher: 400. A similar calculation shows that, after a Y choice, a risk neutral 
subject is indifferent between evading or not in the case where there is no public good (and 
p=1/2). The expected payoff is 0,75y*=300. This subject will choose an X envelope (with 
expected payoff 0,75x*=325. 
Summarizing, in case there are no taxes, a risk neutral subject will choose an X 
envelope. In case of taxes, a public good and an audit probability p=0 or p=1/6, this subject 
will choose a Y-envelope and report an income of 0, irrespective of the income received. In 
case of taxes and p=1/2, this subject will choose X. The same holds when there is no public 
good. Of course, a risk seeking (averse) subject will tend to choose Y more (less) often in all 
cases. Hence, observed choices of Y when p=1/2 indicate risk seeking behavior.  
 
Given our experimental design, we can conjecture on the treatment effects to be expected. 
First, our subject pool treatment was set up to test the distinct levels of tax evasion (and their 
causes) in Albania and the Netherlands. If one assumes that distinct attitudes or cultures 
cause this difference, our first conjecture is that we will observe higher levels of evasion in 
any group in Albania than in any Dutch subject pool. If we do not observe these differences, 
our results will allow us to question this assumption. As for distinct subject pools within a 
country, the implicit assumption in many cross country experiments is that the differences 
within a country are smaller than those between countries. We will take this as our second 
conjecture. 
  In our second treatment, we vary the audit probability. Assuming a similar distribution 
of risk attitudes across countries, this yields our third conjecture that evasion will decrease 
with this probability in both countries. In addition, we can test the influence of risk attitude 
on evasion because choices in the first three rounds provide a measure of this attitude. 
  Finally, for Albanian students, we ran sessions without a public good. As mentioned 
above this was done to test the idea that Albanians do not evade because they want to 
voluntarily contribute to the public good. This gives our fourth and final conjecture that 
evasion will be higher in the sessions without a public good. University of Amsterdam 
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4. RESULTS 
The presentation of the results is split in three parts. After an overview of the choice of 
income type (X or Y), we will present the general results on tax compliance. This is followed 
by a more detailed regression analysis of both decisions. A more general discussion of our 
results and the conjectures on treatment effects will follow in section 5. 
 
4.1. CHOICE OF INCOME 
The choice of income is represented by the fraction of subjects choosing income type Y. 
Recall that there is a difference between the first three rounds of the experiment and the last 
five. In the last five rounds, the choice may be influenced by the fact that X envelopes are 
always audited, whereas the Y envelopes are audited with a probability smaller than 1. In 
these rounds, subjects might choose income Y because it opens the possibility of tax evasion. 
In addition, with the exception of one treatment, a public good is provided in rounds 4-8. This 
too might be a reason to switch from one type of income to another.  
Table 3 displays the Y choices for each subject pool. The choices are split up for the 
first three rounds (choice 1-3) and the last 5 rounds (choice 4-8).  
 Table 3: Fraction of Y-choices per subject pool 
                                                                 Choice of Y 
Subject pools per country 
# sessions/  
# subjects 
Choice 1-3  choice 4-8 
AL – US (prob.=1/6)  2/24  0.47  0.61∗  
AL – US (prob.=0)  2/24  0.36  0.48 
AL – US (no public good, prob. = 1/2)  2/24  0.33  0.45* 
AL – US   2/24  0.44  0.62∗  
AL – HS   2/24  0.46  0.63∗  
AL – HT  2/24  0.43  0.56∗∗  
AL – UT  2/24  0.56  0.63 
AL – UP  2/24  0.39  0.43 
NL – US (prob.=1/6)  2/24  0.17  0.79∗  
NL – US  2/24  0.22  0.68∗  
NL – HS  2/24  0.46  0.57 
NL – HT  1/8  0.25  0.58∗∗  
NL – UP  1/12  0.58  0.62 
ALBANIA (p=1/2, with public good)  5/120  0.46  0.57* 
NETHERLANDS (p=1/2)  4/68  0.37  0.62* 
HS + US (both countries & p=1/2, with public good)  4/96  0.40  0.62* 
HT + UT + UP (both countries & p=1/2)  5/92  0.46  0.55* 
(∗ ) indicates that the difference between choice 4-8 and choice 1-3 is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
(∗∗ ) indicates that the difference between choice 4-8 and choice 1-3 is statistically significant at the 10% level. University of Amsterdam 
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Note: See table 1 for an overview of the treatments distinguished per subject pool. Numbers represent the 
fraction of Y-choices. The dark shaded rows indicate the sessions where the audit probability p=1/6. The light 
shaded rows represent the additional sessions described in the main text. All other rows represent sessions with 
p=1/2. 
 
The following conclusions about the choice between the two types of income can be derived 
from table 3. These conclusions are presented as observations 1-5. 
 
Observation 1: More subjects choose an unregistered income (Y) when tax evasion is added 
as an option. 
Support: In all cases, the fraction of Y choices in rounds 4-8 > the fraction of Y choices in 
rounds 1-3. In 8 out of 13 subject pools, this difference is statistically significant at the 10%-
level or better.  
Aggregating per treatment gives the following results. When the audit probability (p) 
was 1/2 and a public good was provided, Y was chosen 42.6% of the cases in the first three 
rounds and 58.7% of the time in rounds 4-8. This difference is significant at the 1%-level 
(paired sample t=6.10). When the probability was 1/2 and no public good was provided, Y 
was chosen 33% of the time in rounds 1-3 and 45% of the time in rounds 4-8.  This difference 
is significant at the 5%-level (paired sample t=2.57). When the audit probability was 1/6, Y 
was chosen 31.9% of the time in the first three rounds and 70.0% of the time in rounds 4-8. 
This difference is statistically significant at the 1%-level (paired sample t=6.21). When there 
was no audit for Y envelopes (p=0), Y was chosen 36% of the time in rounds 1-3 and 48% of 
the time in rounds 4-8. This difference is not statistically significant (paired sample t=1.57).  
When aggregating per country (p=1/2, with public good), the increase in Y choices is 
significant (for Albania: an increase from 46% to 57%, paired sample t=4.21; for the 
Netherlands: an increase from 37% to 62%, paired sample t=4.52).  
Finally, we can aggregate the data according to subjects' labor market position. We 
denote someone as being on the labor market if they have a job. The groups HS and US are 
therefore not on the labor market (aside from small part time jobs).
14 As a consequence, they 
have little, if any, experience with paying direct taxes, while the other groups do. The 
increase in Y-choices after round 3 is statistically significant at the 1%-level for the 
aggregated observations in each group (paired sample t=5.65 for pupils/students; t=2.83 for 
teachers/personnel). 
                                 
14 This is supported empirically by the answers to the questionnaire distributed at the end of the experiment.    Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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Observation 2: There are no differences across countries in the fraction of Y choices.  
Support: When testing for differences between the two countries at the aggregate level 
(p=1/2, with public good), neither choice 1-3 (independent sample t=1.62) nor choice 4-8 
(independent sample t=0.97) shows differences that are statistically significant at the 10%-
level. 
 
Observation 3: The fraction of Y choices is not affected by labor market position.  
Support: The last two rows of table 3 show the results of this aggregation (for p=1/2, with 
public good). The differences between pupils/students on one hand and teachers/personnel on 
the other are not statistically significant at the 10%-level for either choice 1-3 (independent 
sample t=1.31) or choice 4-8 (independent sample t=1.64). 
 
Observation 4: Changing the audit probability does not effect the fraction of Y choices in 
rounds 4-8 significantly.  
Support: Compare the fractions for US (p = 1/6) with those for US (p = 1/2). When testing for 
each country and variable separately (independent samples t-tests), none of the differences 
are statistically significant at the 10%-level, even though Y is chosen 11%-points more often 
by Dutch students in rounds 4-8 when p=1/6 than when p=1/2. When comparing the fraction 
of Y choices by Albanian students without audit (p=0) with the fractions for p=1/6 or p=1/2, 
we once again find that none of the differences is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
 
Observation 5: There are more Y choices in rounds 4-8 when a public good is provided than 
when no public good is provided. 
15 
Support: Because the sessions without a public good were only run for Albanian students 
with an audit probability of 1/2, we compare their choices with those in the AL-US (p=1/2) 
sessions with public good. Subjects in sessions with a public good chose Y significantly more 
often than subjects in sessions without a public good (62% and 45% of the time, respectively; 
independent samples t=2.02).  
 
                                 
15 Choices in rounds 1-3 are not affected by the audit probability or public good treatments. This is not 
surprising, considering that in these rounds subjects do not even know that there will be taxes, audits and public 
goods later on. University of Amsterdam 
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4.2. TAX EVASION 
First consider the subjects that chose X. Observation 6 summarizes our results on tax evasion 
for these cases.  
 
Observation 6:  In almost all cases, income is reported truthfully after choosing an X 
envelope.  
Support: Across all sessions we observed 588 X choices in rounds 4-8. After choosing X, in 3 
cases (0.5%) less than the actual income was declared and in 18 (3.1%) more was declared. 
In all other (567) cases subjects reported their actual income truthfully. This result does not 
appear to be different in Albania than in the Netherlands.
16 A possible reason for declaring 
more than the actual income will be discussed in section 5. 
 
Next, consider the Y-choices. The distribution of decisions to declare less than (<), equal (=) 
or more than (>) the actual income is shown in table 4, separately for each subject pool. In 
case less than the actual income was declared, the table also reports the number of times that 
this declared income was non-zero. In addition, it gives the average fraction of rounds that 
subjects evaded taxes. To calculate this, for each individual we first determined the fraction 
of times (s)he underreported income, treating over reporting as a missing value. Then, we 
calculated the mean of these fractions across individuals in a subject pool. 
 
                                 
16 More details are available from the authors upon request.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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Table 4: Distribution of income declaration 
  P=1/2, PUBLIC GOOD 
 <  =  >  Evasion
+ 
AL-HS 22  (13) 50  3  0.19 
AL-US 12  (9) 50  12  0.10 
AL-HT 5  (5) 54  8  0.05 
AL-UP 2  (0) 45  4  0.02 
AL-UT 10  (2) 64  1  0.08 
NL-HS 27  (6) 39  2  0.24 
NL-US 46  (3) 35  1  0.39 
NL-HT 1  (1) 18  4  0.03 
NL-UP 5  (1) 30  2  0.09 
Total 130  (40)  385 37  0.14 
  P=1/6, public good 
AL-US 11  (5) 45  17  0.11 
NL-US 65  (10) 20  10  0.58 
Total 76  (15)  65 27  0.34 
  P=0, public good 
AL-US 15  (3) 34  9  0.13 
  P=1/2, no public good 
AL-US 8  (2) 40  6  0.08 
TOTAL 229  (60) 524  79  0.17 
 
Note: numbers represent the number of times the reported income was less than (<), equal to (=) or more than 
(>) the actual income, given that Y was chosen. The numbers in parentheses report the number of times that 
underreporting did not involve reporting income equal to 0. 
 
+This column reports the average fraction of times income was underreported (including X-choices). The way 
in which this was calculated is described in the main text. 
 
This mean is reported in the table in the column 'evasion'. Our conclusions on tax evasion 
after choosing unregistered income (Y-envelope) are presented as observations 7-14.  
 
Observation 7: Not everyone switching to Y after round 3 evades taxes. 
Support: This observation is drawn from a comparison of tables 3 and 4. We can determine 
the increase in Y-choices after round 3 in table 3 and compare this to the extent of tax evasion 
in table 4. For example, there is a 14%-point increase for AL-US (p=1/6) and the average 
evasion in this group is 11%. Hence, not everyone switching to Y decides to evade taxes 
(note that this conclusion is even stronger when considering the fact that some of the 11% 
were already choosing Y). This conclusion holds for the majority of groups. In aggregate, the 
increase in Y choices after round 3 is 19 %-points and the average evasion is 17%.  
 University of Amsterdam 
Tax Evasion and the Source of Income: An Experimental Study in Albania and the Netherlands  30
Observation 8:  In aggregate, underreporting of income occurs far more often than over 
reporting. This asymmetry is observed in about half of the subject pools. Overreporting is 
observed more in Albania than in the Netherlands. 
Support: In aggregate, the number of times income is underreported (229) is much higher 
than the number of times subjects report too much (79). However, there are various groups 
where the number of times income was underreported is similar to the number of times it was 
over reported. For the groups AL-HS, AL-UT, NL-HS, NL-US and AL-US (p=0), tax 
evasion (underreporting) appears to be more systematic than overreporting of income. For the 
other groups, the differences in the number of times income is under- or overreported are 
small.
17 Contrary to what we observed for X choices, overreporting appears to be more 
prevalent in Albania than in the Netherlands. For p=1/2, with public good, Albanians 
reported more than the actual income in 28 out of 342 decisions (8.2%) and the Dutch did so 
in 9 out of 210 decisions (4.3%). For p=1/6, Albanians overreported on 17 out of 73 
occasions (23.3%) and the Dutch did so 10 out of 95 times (10.5%). This is tested formally 
using χ
2 tests per round. Considering only the Y-choices where income was not reported 
honestly, we compare the distribution of choices across under- and overreporting per country. 
In both treatments where a comparison between countries is possible (p=1/2 and p=1/6), the 
extent of overreporting relative to underreporting was higher in Albania than in the 
Netherlands. In 7 of the 10 tests (two audit probabilities, 5 rounds) this effect is statistically 
significant at the 10%-level. In 5 of these tests it is significant at the 5%-level.  
At first sight, reporting too much income does not make sense. If an audit takes place, 
nothing is gained or lost compared to truthful reporting. If no audit takes place, more taxes 
are paid (based on reported income) than necessary. Note that the payoff is determined by the 
actual income, not by the reported income. We will return to this point in the following 
section.  
 
                                 
17 Not shown in the table is the observation that overreporting was quite constant across rounds. For p=1/2 with 
public good, for example, the 37 times that too much income was reported occurred 9, 4, 8, 11, and 5 times in 
rounds 4-8, respectively.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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Observation 9: It occurs quite often that subjects decide to evade taxes but do not evade them 
completely. This is more common in Albania than in the Netherlands. 
Support: In 60 out of 229 cases (26.2%) subjects reported an income higher than zero but 
lower than their actual income. For p=1/2 with public good, Albanians evaded taxes 51 times. 
In 29 cases (56.9%) they declared more than 0, however. Only 11 out of 79 cases (13.9%) 
with tax evasion in the Netherlands showed a reported income higher than 0. Similar numbers 
hold for p=1/6. As noted above, a selfish, rational individual evading taxes will report 0. We 
shall return to this phenomenon in section 5. 
 
To get a better grip on tax evasion in our experiments, we now continue the analysis by 
considering the extent  of tax evasion (in other words, the extent of underreporting per 
individual) while treating the cases where too much income was reported as missing values. 
In addition, we will not make a distinction with respect to how much is evaded: any reported 
income lower than the actual income is considered as tax evasion. This analysis is based on 
the numbers presented in the column ‘evasion’ in table 4.  
 
Observation 10: Tax evasion is higher in the Netherlands than in Albania. 
Support: Overall, the extent of tax evasion is larger in the Netherlands (0.58 for p=1/6 and 
0.24 for p=1/2 with public good) than in Albania (0.11 and 0.09, respectively). This country 
difference is statistically significant at the 1%-level in both cases (independent sample t=5.93 
for p=1/6 and t=3.58 for p=1/2). 
 
Observation 11: Pupils and students evade taxes more than other groups do. 
Support: For p=1/2 with public good, we aggregate the data according to labor market 
position (HS/US versus HT/UT/UP). The pupils and students have a higher level of non-
compliance (0.23 for both countries together; 0.14 in Albania and 0.31 in the Netherlands) 
than the pool of teachers/personnel (0.05 in aggregate, 0.05 in Albania and 0.06 in the 
Netherlands). This difference is statistically different at the 1%-level (independent sample 
t=5.11). 
 University of Amsterdam 
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Observation 12: Differences across groups within a country are at least as important as 
differences between countries. 
Support: This follows from the analysis underlying observations 10 and 11. The aggregated 
group of Dutch pupils and students evades taxes more often than this group in Albania does 
(0.31 versus 0.14). Both groups evade more often than teachers/personnel in either country 
(0.06 versus 0.05). Non-pupils/students do not differ across the two countries. The difference 
between pupils/students in the two countries appears when comparing the two nations in 
aggregate. The difference when aggregating per country (0.24-0.09) is smaller than when 
aggregating per labor market position (0.23-0.05).
18  
 
Observation 13:  Tax evasion in Albania is not affected by the audit probability; Dutch 
subjects evade more when the audit probability is lower. 
Support: An increase in the probability from 0 to 1/6 to 1/2 only marginally decreased 
evasion amongst Albanian (university) students, from 0.13 to 0.11 to 0.10 (cf. table 4). None 
of the pair wise differences is statistically significant at the 10% level. Dutch students, 
however, had the tendency to comply less when the audit probability was 1/6 (0.58) than 
when it was 1/2 (0.39). This difference is statistically significant at the 10%-level 
(independent sample t=1.80).  
 
Observation 14: The provision of a public good does not affect the extent to which Albanian 
students evade taxes. 
Support: The sessions without a public good were only run for Albanian students with p=1/2. 
The results show a marginally higher level of evasion if a public good is provided (0.10) than 
if it is not (0.08). The difference is not statistically significant at the 10% level, however. 
Note that the difference is even in the wrong direction if we consider the conjecture that 
Albanians comply more when a public good is provided.  
 
                                 
18 Note that we can only make this comparison for p=1/2, with public good, because we only varied subject 
pools for these parameters (cf. table 1).   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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4.3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
In order to analyze subjects' decisions in more detail, we ran regressions. The first choice we 
want to explain is the decision whether or not to evade taxes. Denote the variable describing 
the extent of evasion (the column 'evasion' in table 4) by E. We estimated coefficients of two 
models where the dependent variable was derived from this variable. In model A, the variable 
to be explained is the decision whether or not to evade taxes at least once. In model B, the 
dependent variable is (a function of) the extent of tax evasion. For model A, we transformed 
E by defining a dummy variable E’: E’=0, if E=0 and E’=1, otherwise. In other words, E’ is 
equal to 1 if a subject underreported income at least once in rounds 4-8. Model A is a logit 
regression with dependent variable E’. In model B, we transformed E to correct for the fact 
that its values are constrained to the interval [0,1]. In this model, the dependent variable Ê = 
ln[(E+0.001)/(1-E+0.001)].
19 Model B is a linear regression with Ê as dependent variable.
20  
As independent variables, we used the following.  
•  COUNTRY is a dummy variable with value 0 for the Netherlands and 1 for Albania. 
•  LABORMARKET is a dummy variable equal to 0 for teachers/personnel and 1 for 
pupils/students. 
•  AUDPROB0 is a dummy representing the audit probability with value 1 for sessions 
where p=0 and 0 otherwise. 
•  AUDPROB1/6 is a dummy representing the audit probability with value 1 for sessions 
where p=1/6 and 0 otherwise. 
•  NOPUBGOOD is a dummy variable with value 1 for sessions without a public good and 
0 otherwise. 
•  CHOICE 13 represents the fraction of choices in the first three rounds where the subjects 
chose Y. As explained above, this is a measure of risk aversion with higher values 
indicating more risk seeking behavior. 
                                 
19 The constant 0.001 is added to the numerator and denominator because Ê would otherwise not be defined for 
E=0 or E=1. The results are not affected by adding a dummy variable to the independent variables selecting the 
cases where E=0 or 1.  
20 Note that it is not reasonable to treat the individual choices in distinct rounds as independent observations. 
This is why we consider the extent of evasion as the variable to be explained in model B. University of Amsterdam 
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•  EARN 48 is equal to total actual earnings (in francs, before taxes and public good) 
divided by 10,000.
21 
•  AGE is the subject’s age divided by 100. 
•  JOB is a dummy variable with value 1 if the subject has a (part time) job and 0 otherwise. 
For all teachers and personnel, the value is 1. Because these groups are represented by 
LABORMARKET, JOB distinguishes pupils/students with a parttime job from those 
without. 
•  GENDER is a dummy variable equal to 0 for men and 1 for women. 
 
Table 5 presents the regression results. The results are quite similar for the two models. First 
of all, the background variables AGE and JOB do not affect tax evasion in either model. 
Gender does appear to have an influence: women are less inclined to evade taxes at least once 
(model A) than men (a similar result is reported in Giese and Hoffman, 1999). The difference 
between men and women just misses statistical significance in explaining the extent of tax 
evasion (model B).  
 
Table 6: Regression results 
  MODEL A – Logit  MODEL B - OLS 
Dependent variable  E’  Ê 
Constant  -1.61 (0.12)  -5.73 (0.00)* 
COUNTRY  -1.34 (0.00)*  -1.64 (0.00)* 
LABORMARKET  1.01 (0.06)**  1.06 (0.06)** 
AUDPROB0  -0.16 (0.77)  -0.18 (0.76) 
AUDPROB1/6  0.73 (0.06)**  1.02 (0.02)* 
NOPUBGOOD  -0.52 (0.41)  -0.51 (0.39) 
CHOICE 1-3  0.97 (0.04)*  0.65 (0.18) 
EARN 4-8  3.91 (0.12)  4.63 (0.08)** 
AGE  0.30 (0.96)  0.22 (0.91) 
JOB  -0.02 (0.96)  0.11 (0.80) 
GENDER -0.53  (0.09)**  -0.54(0.11) 
(*) indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; (**)indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
Note: numbers represent the regression coefficient; p-values in parentheses.  
 
                                 
21 Obviously, there is a possible endogeneity problem related to the inclusion of earn 4-8 as an independent 
variable. It is the only direct way to check the effect of earnings on evasion in a regression context, however. 
The conclusions for the other variables do not change if earn 4-8 is dropped from the regressions.    Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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Second, the risk attitude of subjects, as measured by their choices in the first three rounds 
affects the decision to evade at least once but not the extent of tax evasion. The positive 
coefficient implies that risk-seeking subjects are more likely to evade taxes at least once. 
Third, the earnings in round 4-8 do not affect the decision whether or not to evade at least 
once but do affect the extent of tax evasion. Subjects who earn more evade more. This is in 
line with results by Giese and Hoffman (1999), who also find a positive effect of income on 
tax evasion.  
Third, three variables related to our treatments: country, labor market position, and 
audit probability, have significant effects on the decision whether or not to evade taxes. The 
Dutch evade more than the Albanians do and pupils/students evade more than 
teachers/personnel. With an audit probability of 1/6, subjects are more inclined to evade taxes 
at least once and they also evade more often (compared to an audit probability of 1/2). 
Surprisingly, we find no significant differences in tax evasion between p=0 and p=1/2. These 
results are in line with observations 10, 11, and 13. In line with observation 14, there is no 
significant effect of the no-public good treatment. 
 
Finally, we analyze the decisions of income choice (X or Y) and tax evasion jointly. To do 
so, we need data on both choices simultaneously. Therefore, we cannot aggregate across 
rounds, as before. On the other hand, we cannot treat an individual’s choices in distinct 
rounds as independent observations. As a consequence, we only consider these choices in one 
of the rounds 4-8, to wit, round 4. 
  The model is a two step logit for the choice of income source and tax evasion. The 
method is explained in Maddala (1983) and applied in Schram (1992). First (step 1), a logit 
regression is estimated for the binary choice whether or not to evade taxes in round 4. This is 
done for the set of subjects that chose Y. The parameters estimated (β e) are then used to 
determine the so-called 'inclusive value' Ii: 
 
(1) Ii = log[1+exp(Xi'β e)], 
where Xi denotes the vector of independent variables for individual i.  
 University of Amsterdam 
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In step 2, a logit regression is estimated for the binary choice between income source X or Y. 
For this regression, the inclusive value of step 1 is added as a regressor. For the probability of 
choosing Y, this yields: 
 
(2) Priy = 1/{1+exp(X'β x - σ  Ii)}, 
where β x and σ  are parameters to be estimated.  
 
To understand (2), consider two special cases. For  σ  = 0, (2) reduces to: 
 
(3) Priy = 1/{1+exp(X'β x)}, 
 
and for σ  = 1 we have: 
 
(4) Priy = {1+exp(Xi'β e)}/{ 1+exp(Xi'β e) + exp(X'β x)}. 
 
Equations (3) and (4) both describe the probability of choosing Y for special cases. (3) is a 
binomial logit model for the choice of X or Y. When deciding on X or Y, the individual does 
not consider the possibilities of evading after choosing Y (Priy is independent of β e). Hence, 
for σ  = 0 the income and evasion decisions are made sequentially. 
In (4), we have a multinomial logit probability for a model with three choices: choose 
X (denoted by x), choose Y and evade (ye), or choose Y and comply (c). The corresponding 
probabilities are, respectively: 
 
(5a) Prix = exp(X'β y)}/{ 1+exp(Xi'β e) + exp(X'β y)} 
(5b) Priye = exp(Xi'β e)}/{ 1+exp(Xi'β e) + exp(X'β y)} 
(5c) Priyc = 1/{ 1+exp(Xi'β e) + exp(X'β y)}. 
  
In this case, i is considering the choice problem as if it consists of three distinct and equally 
weighted options: X, Y-evade and Y-comply. Hence, when deciding which envelope to 
choose, this individual takes the possibility of evading into account. The probability of 
choosing Y (4) is the sum of the probabilities of choosing Y and evading (5b) and choosing Y 
and not evading (5c). Hence, for σ  = 1 the income and evasion decisions are made 
simultaneously.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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As a consequence, an estimate of σ  provides information about the way in which the 
decisions to choose X or Y and whether or not to evade taxes are related. A coefficient close 
to 0 implies that the decision between X and Y is made independent of the subsequent tax 
evasion decision. A coefficient close to 1 is evidence that the decisions about income source 
and evasion are made simultaneously. 
 
Observation 15: The decisions about income source and tax evasion are made simultaneously 
in round 4. 
Support: We estimated the coefficients of eqs. (1)-(2) using the same regressors as in table 5 
for step 1 and the treatment variables for country, labor market position and audit probability 
as independent variables in step 2.
22 We estimate a coefficient σ  = 2.21, with a 95% 
confidence interval for σ  of (0.80, 3.62). Hence, we reject σ =0 but do not reject σ =1.  
 
                                 
22 The results of the regressions are not reported here because these regressions use only one round of data, 
whereas the results in table 5 are based on all the data we have on evasion. Most of the results from table 5 are 
also found when considering only round 4, however. Details are available upon request. University of Amsterdam 
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5. A  DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
First, consider the three novel features of our experimental design: it compares tax evasive 
behavior in a developed country to that in a country in transition; it compares tax evasion 
across subject pools within countries; and it introduces a new laboratory environment 
consisting of two types of income. All three have proven to be empirically important. Though 
we found differences across countries, they were opposite to what we observe outside of the 
laboratory. The implications of these differences are discussed below. We have also shown 
that significant differences across groups exist that are sometimes larger in magnitude than 
the differences between countries. The distinction in type of income also turned out to be 
important. When tax evasion was possible, there was a shift towards unregistered income. 
This shift did not differ significantly across subject pools. As discussed in section 1, this may 
distort the allocation of labor across different types of income. 
Consider the conjectures on our treatment effects as discussed in section 3. The first 
was that evasion would be higher in Albania. We observed the opposite. Second, we expected 
differences within a country to be smaller that differences across countries. Again, we 
observed the opposite. The third conjecture was that evasion would decrease with audit 
probability. This was observed in the Netherlands but not in Albania. Finally, the conjecture 
that more evasion would take place if there was no public good was not supported. We did 
observe a decrease in choices of unregistered income when there was no public good, but this 
did not lead to more evasion. All in all, it appears that our conjectures (which were mainly 
based on the existing literature) are not capturing what is happening in our experiments.  
 
We summarize the patterns of choices that cannot be explained by the simple theoretical 
framework: (i) there was some overreporting of income in all subject pools (cf. observation 
8); (ii) in many cases, tax evasion was incomplete, i.e., did not involve reporting an income 
of zero (cf. observation 9); (iii) there was a significant move towards Y-choices that could not 
be completely attributed to the possibility of tax evasion (cf. observation 7); (iv) in sessions 
without a public good, subjects chose the unregistered income less often (cf. observation 5). 
(i) and (ii) were observed more often in Albania than in the Netherlands, whereas (iv) is 
based on data that were only gathered in Albania.  University of Amsterdam 
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These observations might be explained by the role of the public good in combination 
with other regarding preferences. The theoretical discussion presented in section 3 assumes 
that individuals attribute utility to personal earnings only. If they also attribute utility to the 
earnings of others (through altruism or considerations of fairness, for example) then they 
might want to give more (pay taxes) because it increases their utility.
23 Overreporting and 
incomplete evasion can thus be interpreted as voluntary contributions to the public good. 
Subjects might also be willing to switch to the (more risky) Y envelopes in case their taxes 
contribute to a public good. In that case, Y incomes become less attractive when there is no 
public good.
24 Finally, we still have the interesting phenomenon that overreporting and 
incomplete evasion are observed more often in Albania than in the Netherlands. If an 
explanation along the lines of other regarding preferences is maintained, this may be related 
to the communist past of Albania. A basic norm of the communist regime that ruled Albania 
for over 40 years was that of a common property. 
An alternative explanation is that we are simply observing erratic behavior. There are a 
few conclusions from our data that seem to point against simple error as an explanation, 
however. First of all, all these phenomena are quite constant across rounds. Second, there are 
clear differences across groups. For example, Albanian university students overreport their 
income much more often than Albanian high school pupils. There is no reason why university 
students would err more often. If the public good explanation holds, we are left with the 
interesting conclusion that it is more prevalent in Albania than in the Netherlands. Future 
research will have to show the importance of and provide explanations for these results. 
 
                                 
23 For a discussion of the literature in other regarding preferences, see Charness and Rabin (2002), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), or Schram (2000), for example. The theory on other regarding preferences has developed 
tremendously over the past few years. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to 
estimate the parameters in one of the models (the most general model, by Charness and Rabin, 2002 seems a 
prime candidate) in Albania and the Netherlands. Based on our results, we would predict that Albanians have a 
higher coefficient for social welfare and are more inequity averse than the Dutch. 
24 Table 4 also shows that overreporting and evasion greater than 0 occur less in the no public good sessions 
than in the comparable sessions with public good.   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The literature shows fine examples of both non-experimental and experimental research on 
tax evasion. The latter offers the opportunity to study individual behavior in a controlled 
environment. This is what the study in this paper does. It allows us to compare behavior 
across two countries, Albania and the Netherlands, as well as across various socio-economic 
groups within these countries, when institutions are controlled for. This makes it easier to 
understand differences in behavior across countries and cultures. In addition, our study puts 
the experimental environment closer to reality than previous experiments on tax evasion have 
done by providing two sources of income: registered and unregistered. Our results show that 
this is a relevant distinction: the decisions about income source (i.e. labor supply) and evasion 
of taxes are made simultaneously. 
At first sight (supported by the scarce empirical evidence that is available), Albania is 
characterized by a larger extent of tax evasion than the Netherlands. However, when we 
controlled for differences across institutions, this country difference was the other way 
around. If it is true that tax evasion outside the laboratory in Albania is higher than in the 
Netherlands, than our experiments show that this is not a consequence of differences in 
attitudes or cultures. If it were, we would have found higher evasion in the Albanian sessions. 
Apparently, differences in tax institutions between the two countries –which do not appear in 
the experiments- matter. In ongoing research, one of the authors (Gërxhani) has analyzed data 
from a large household survey in Tirana, which collects more information about tax evasive 
behavior. A combination of this evidence with the experimental results of this paper indicates 
that the distinct formal institutions and their ‘informal’ use by individuals cause the different 
levels of tax evasion in the two countries. For a detailed analysis see Gërxhani (2002). 
Furthermore, our cross subject pool design in both countries has shown that it is 
dangerous to draw conclusions about ‘cross cultural’ differences from experiments that use 
only one subject pool in each country. For example, if we had only compared high school 
teachers in both countries, we would have concluded that evasion is higher in Albania. This 
provides a caveat for the interpretation of distinct experimental results that have been 
observed across countries.  
 University of Amsterdam 
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As discussed in the introduction, our initial motivation for conducting this study lies in 
Gërxhani’s (2002) assertion that the level of a country’s development is important for 
understanding tax evasion. This is supported by our results. We have argued that the high 
level of tax evasion in the Albanian society is due to inadequate formal tax collecting 
institutions. This means that policies aimed at increasing the level of tax compliance should 
be aimed at building institutions (e.g., new laws, well trained and motivated tax collecting 
organizations, proper enforcement mechanisms, etc.). For the Netherlands, our results imply 
that a good way to increase compliance is by increasing the audit probability.    Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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INSTRUCTIONS PART I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Welcome to this experiment. Here you can earn money. The amount of money you earn will depend on your 
own decisions, on the decisions of other participants and on the outcome of a random event. The money will be 
paid to you personally and privately from the other participants. Your decisions are anonymous. They are not 
related to your name. In addition, there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ decisions in the experiment. This is not a test. We 
only want to study the decisions people make.  
 
The currency we are going to operate with during the experiment is called experimental francs. When the 
experiment is finished, the amount in francs will be converted to guilders by dividing the total earnings by 50.
26 
Therefore, you can always calculate your earnings in guilders by dividing the amount in francs by 50.  
 
The structure of the experiment 
The 12 participants in this experiment are divided into 3 groups of 4. We will call them group 1, group 2 and 
group 3. The experiment consists of 8 rounds. You will stay in the same group in all rounds, but you will not 
know who else is in your group. Soon, we will let you know what group you are in, but this is not so important 
with respect to the decisions.  
 
The decision made in each round is independent of the decisions made in other rounds. After the third round, we 
will change something in the decision making process. The exact information about this change will be 
explained to you when that moment comes.  
 
The decision 
In every round, you have to choose an envelope. There are two types of envelopes. We call them X-envelopes 
and Y-envelopes. There are six envelopes of each type. We will soon come by every desk one by one. Then you 
will have to inform us whether you want an X-envelope or a Y-envelope. We will take the six envelopes of the 
type you chose and you may pick one of the six. You will find an amount of money written inside the envelope. 
For the first three rounds, this amount represents your earnings per round.  
 
                                 
25 This is the basic outline of all instructions used in the experiments. Other instructions, based on the various 
treatments described in the main text, are available upon request.  
26 In Albania, it is converted to Leks by dividing the total earnings by 3.   University of Amsterdam 
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Of course, you do not know beforehand the amount you will get. However, we will now tell you the amounts 












Hence, if you choose an X-envelope, you will get one of these amounts in that round.  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
In the Y-envelopes, there are also six different amounts. They are: 







Hence, if you choose a Y-envelope, you will get one of these amounts in that round.  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Presenting your decision 
You are not allowed to talk during the experiment. For this reason you will inform us about your decision in 





  Choice 
X or Y 
Round 1  X  Y 
Round 2  X  Y 
Round 3  X  Y 
 
The procedure is easy for rounds 1, 2 and 3. When round 1 begins, we will ask you to circle a X or a Y. If you 
want an X-envelope, you should circle ‘X’, and if you want a Y-envelope, you should circle ‘Y’. When we 
come along, we will see what you have chosen. Then, we will let you choose from the six envelopes of that 
type. You can pick one of the envelopes. You may see for yourself how much you have earned. We do not need 
to know at that stage. You simply keep the envelope. When the experiment is finished, you take the envelope 
with you for the payment procedure. We will then give you the amount of money written inside the envelope in 
cash.    Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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Now you will have a few of minutes to read these instructions again. If you have any questions, raise your hand, 
and one of us will come to you to answer that question. If you are finished, please remain quiet until we start the 
experiment.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS PART II 
 
THE FUND 
We will add something for the following rounds. Again, you have to choose an X- or a Y-envelope, which 
determines your earnings. Now, everybody must contribute part of her/his earnings to a fund. To be more 
precise, everybody should contribute 25% or a quarter of her/his earnings.  
 
The money collected from a group (there are three groups in total) will then be distributed to all participants of 
the group. Hence, if one group contributes a total of 500 francs to the fund in a round, everybody of that group 
will receive 125 francs from the fund. This is independent of the amount contributed by each member of the 
group individually.   
 
Reporting your earnings  
Because we cannot see how much you earn per round (you pick an envelope and open it yourself), you must 
report your earning to us in each round. The amount reported will determine your contribution. It is up to you to 
report the actual amount of your earning or some other amount. 
 
The audit 
There is a probability that we will audit your reported income. If you have chosen an X-envelope, we will 
always audit whether you reported the correct amount. We will do this by looking inside your envelope. If you 
have picked a Y-envelope, we will throw a die to decide whether or not we will audit. If the die shows a 1 (one), 
2 (two) or 3 (three), we will audit the amount reported. Otherwise, we will not. Hence, in the case of a Y-
envelope, there is a probability of 1/2 that the reported amount will be audited. In the case of an X-envelope, the 
report will always be audited.  
 
There are two possibilities if we audit your reported amount. 
   If the amount written inside the envelope is the same as the amount reported, we will write it down and you 
will contribute 25% of that amount to the fund. 
   If the amount is not the same, we will write down your actual earnings. You will have to pay 25% of these 
earnings to the fund. In addition, you have to pay 25% of your actual earnings as a fine for declaring less. If 
you have reported more than your actual earnings, you do not have to pay a fine. Collected fines are not 
deposited in the fund.  
 University of Amsterdam 
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Again: if we do not audit your reported earnings, your contribution will be 25% of these reported earnings. The 
actual earnings, that will be paid to you at the end, will be determined by the actual amount in the envelope. You 
have to take this envelope with you when you go to be paid at the end of the experiment. If we do not audit you, 
we do not know during the experiment whether or not you have reported the correct amount.  
 
Your final earnings 
Your final earnings from round 4 to round 8 will be calculated when you come one by one at the end of the 
experiment and receive the money you have earned today.  
 
(1)  We determine the actual earnings (in francs) by adding up the amounts in your envelopes.  
(2)  Then, we count the amount that your group deposited in the fund for the five rounds altogether. This total 
amount will be divided by 4 (the number of group members) and the result (in francs) will be added to your 
earnings. 
(3)  Further, we determine the total amount that you contributed to the fund. This amount will be subtracted 
from your earnings.  
(4)  At the end, we determine whether you have to pay fines or not, and if yes, how much. This amount will also 
be subtracted from your earnings.  
(5)  In this way, we know your total earnings in francs. These  will be divided by 50 in order to determine your 
earnings in guilders. This is the amount you will receive from us. 
 
Registration 
We want your decisions to remain anonymous. This is the reason why the procedure is made such that the other 
participants cannot see from our behavior what you have chosen. Therefore, the procedure during rounds 4-8 is 
as follows. 
 
First, we come along to give you a chance to choose an envelope. This is done in the same way as in the first 
three rounds. Then, you will have a chance to declare your earnings in the space provided in the table that will 
now be distributed.  
 
PARTICIPANT: __ 
GROUP __   Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies   
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  Choice  
X or Y 
Earnings  
(reported by you) 
ACTUAL EARNINGS 
(to be filled out by 
us) 
Contribution to the fund 
(to be filled out by us) 
Fine 
(to be filled 
out by us) 
Round 4  X  Y         
Round 5  X  Y         
Round 6  X  Y         
Round 7  X  Y         
Round 8  X  Y         
 
The reported earnings can be the same as the amount in your envelope, but you can also report a different 
amount.  
 
Then, we will come by again, and the following will happen.  
(i)  First, we throw a die. 
(ii)  Then, we see whether you have chosen an X- or a Y-envelope in that round.  
(iii)  If you have an X-envelope, we will audit the amount, independent of the number on the die. If you 
have a Y-envelope, we will audit the amount only if the die shows number 1 (one), 2 (two), or 3 
(three).  
(iv)  If we do not audit the envelope, we will write in your table (in the space ‘actual earnings’) ‘no audit’. If 
we do audit the envelope, we will write the actual earnings in your table. This is your reported amount, 
if you reported the actual amount.  
(v)  Then, we will write down your contribution to the fund of your group in the table. In case of an audit, 
this is 25% of the actual amount. In case no audit took place, this is 25% of your reported amount.  
(vi)  Finally, we determine whether you should pay a fine. If you are not audited or if your reported amount 
appears to be equal to (or larger than) the actual amount after been audited, we will write down a zero 
(0). If after being audited, your reported amount is smaller than the actual amount, we will write down 
25% of the actual amount.  
 
After we have been by everybody, we will start the next round. Note that during the experiment, we do not give 
any information about the total amount in the funds.  
 
It may take a while to finish a round. It is important that you remain seated quietly and do not communicate with 
the other participants.  
 
Now you can read these instructions again for a few minutes before we start the fourth round.  
 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTED AT THE END OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Your  gender  (please  check):       …  male  …  female 
Your  age  (please  enter):       …… 
Your education (please check or enter):        …..Economics 
         …..Other,  to  wit  .………………… 
How many hours per week do you work (please enter)?    ……… University of Amsterdam 
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